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The debate about the operation of Brazilian political 
institutions is far from conclusive. It could hardly be different, 
since current Brazilian democratic regime is only 30 years-old. 
This article updates a previous one, published in 2000, in which I 
discuss different and rival interpretations on the functioning of 
the Brazilian democracy. Some new works argue that a 'dialectic 
synthesis' of those strands has been recently produced. This 
article demonstrates this argument is not accurate. Instead, my 
main argument is that, in spite of rich analyses, new evidences and 
some displacements, the interpretations and paradigms guiding 
that debate remain the same. On the other hand, in spite of the 
solid position of the interpretation sustaining how the Brazilian 
political system ensures governability, the current institutional 
debate goes far beyond this paradigm by setting new themes and 
approaches. To demonstrate this argument, the article presents 
the evolution of such debate.  
 Keywords: Brazil; political institutions; Brazilian politics; 
governability.  
 
 
 
ack in 2000, I published an article in the Revista Dados, entitled 
"How is Brazil governed? The Debate about political institutions and 
management of the government", in which I presented a report on the debate 
among interpretative trends of the Brazilian political system. Instigated by the 
reactions to that report, and by the interest that it still raises, I give continuity in 
this article to that work, in the light of a handful of recent contributions. 
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My main argument is that, although recent analyses about the Brazilian 
political system have introduced new evidence as well as have taken the discussion 
to new analytical dimensions, the interpretations and paradigms leading the 
debate remain the same. No matter how well established the paradigm asserting 
that the Brazilian political system ensures governability is, we assure that the 
debate about Brazil is moving far beyond. By the moment, we can say that it does 
so without breaking with old paradigms, but instead raising some new issues. This 
is the case of rethinking the notion of governability, perhaps very narrowly defined 
as the ability of the Executive to obtain, and hold, disciplined majorities in 
Parliament. Nowadays, the notion of governability also makes reference to good 
governance, and to the quality of public policy. 
 
Dialectic synthesis or parallelism of interpretations? 
Timothy Power (2010) argues that the debate about the operation of the 
Brazilian political system would have produced a 'dialectic synthesis', with the 
publication of Pereira and Melo (2014). In this section, I argue, in contrast, that it 
would be more accurate to say that there is new evidence indicating antagonistic 
interpretations about conditions that explain the governability of the Brazilian 
political system. 
Power (2010) wrote an article entirely dedicated to interpretations of the 
Brazilian political system over the time. The author distinguishes a first 
interpretation, pessimistic, and characterized by a diagnosis of ungovernability, 
that would have prevailed until middle 90s (AMES, 2001; LAMOUNIER, 1996; 
MAINWARING, 1999), from a second one, optimistic, in the sense of claiming that 
the institutions of the Brazilian political system are governable, and that would 
have become dominant at the end of that decade (AMORIM NETO, COX and 
MCCUBBINS, 2003; FIGUEIREDO and LIMONGI, 1999; PEREIRA and MUELLER, 
2004; SANTOS, 2003), and from a third one, which, Power (2010) mentions, can be 
called coalitional presidentialism that "is somewhat of a 'grand unification' of 
earlier models, in the sense that it can accommodate insights from both the 
'pessimists' and the 'optimists' at the same time" (POWER, 2010, p. 19). In that 
way, the author says: "the extensive literature about Brazilian political institutions 
can now be seen as assuming a rather clear dialectical form" (POWER, 2010, p. 19). 
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As we can see, according to Power (2010), those paradigms have been 
successive over the time. In addition, there was an integration of them as the third 
paradigm would have incorporated elements of the previous two. It would be a 
dialectical movement in which the third paradigm would obviously be the 
synthesis. 
Indeed, the three interpretations systematized by Power(2010) are 
currently discussing with one another1. Far from being considered in a diachronic-
dialectic sequence, they coexist today and do not involve a synthesis process. 
Although they emerged at different times, new interpretations did not replace 
previous ones. They remain, to a greater extent, more as live positions of a wide-
ranging discussion, than as integrated components of a new interpretation. In 
reality, it is legitimate to wonder whether such an interpretation, new and 
synthetic, exists. 
Certainly, the evidences underlying different positions change, but 
positions do not. Power (2010) mentions that "coalitional presidentialisms often 
used as a shorthand for the totality of ways in which macropolitics has adapted to 
the Constitution of 1988" (POWER, 2010, p. 26), but the notion of coalitional 
presidentialism, as a way of adaptation to the rules of the game is already 
considered by Abranches (1988). So, the Constitution of 1988 came after. 
Moreover, this 'totality of ways' is doubtfully a 'totality', in the sense that it can be 
seen as a cohesive understanding of the the parts of the discussion in such a way 
that it integrates the different positions. 
The first stage of the debate identified by Power (2010) is, as I said before, 
dominated by pessimism: it is a diagnosis of ungovernability. Barry Ames (2001) 
was probably – indicates Power (2010) – the most holistic of the critics of the 
Brazilian political system (POWER, 2010, p. 21). Armijo et al. (2006) also described 
in that way by arguing that: "the scholarly consensus suggests that a new 
democracy that is presidential, has centrifugal electoral rules (such as PR), and has 
extensive institutional separation of powers and purpose... should be particularly 
difficult to govern" (ARMIJO et al., 2006, p. 761). Bolivar Lamounier (1996) once 
characterized Brazil as subject to a 'hyperactive paralysis syndrome' (HP). 
                                                          
1 As is the case, explicitly, of Palermo, 2000. 
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The crisis of this first interpretative paradigm emerged together with two 
processes. First, performances of government that clashed frontally with the 
interpretation of ungovernability were observed. Second, and somewhat later, the 
analysis of data about political process – as the discipline at the Chamber of 
Deputies -, also being inconsistent with this interpretation, forced to seek 
explanations that differed from those dominating until then. 
Thus, the identification of game rules that had hitherto received poor 
attention, allowed setting up what Figueiredo and Limongi (1998) called the 
"institutional bases of coalitional presidentialism" (FIGUEIREDO AND LIMONGI, 
1998, p. 82). This type of presidentialism condensed, in the emergence of  a new 
interpretation, a set of rules of solid explanatory power on the governance, that 
was perceived in the political system as a stronger presidential power in relation 
to the previous constitutions, or as a centralization of legislative production. 
This a rather optimistic interpretation has, as a central point, what has 
been described as executive dominance. The idea of executive dominance 
normalizes the Brazilian presidentialism, freeing it from pathological edges 
allocated by the first interpretative paradigm, and placing it in the more general 
category of presidentialist regimes tout court (thus, the concept of coalitional 
presidentialism remains strongly associated with this paradigm). Amorim Neto 
(2006)  asserts that: "In a model of modern presidential government, the president 
is politically dominant in all the critical areas ... the new Brazilian democratic 
regime would be a clear example of a modern presidential government" (AMORIM 
NETO, 2006, p.320). 
However, this characterization was soon softened by the central feature of 
Brazilian presidentialism, which is, establishing coalition governments. In coalition 
governments the executive loses unipersonal centrality. The distribution of 
decision-making power – and not so much of other material or symbolic goods, 
which also takes place – is relevant in Brazilian coalitional presidentialism. In this 
way, a double movement around the president takes place: on one hand, he uses 
the available institutional instruments to centralize decision-making but, on the 
other, he decentralizes it through the composition of the coalition cabinet. 
According to Power (2010), a new phase in the evolution of interpretative 
paradigms is focused on party alliances, that is, the balances established between 
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the parties of the governing coalition and their forces in Congress. But the 
attention on the behavior of these parties would not be of any importance, if it 
were not because it illustrates a point that must be highlighted: it reveals that 
similar interpretative positions being have been debated over time. Examining the 
behavior of the parties belonging to the governing coalitions is just the other side 
of the coin of the persistence of problems identified by the first paradigm. 
In fact, if you take into account the (relatively) stable and successful 
coalitions of Fernando Henrique and Lula, as mentioned by Power (2010), it can be 
seen that they used four tools: "continual adjustment of three variables (size, 
heterogeneity and proportionality of the support coalition in Congress), plus the 
use of pork (budgetary clientelism)"(POWER, 2010, p. 27). Now, each one of those 
tools serves a problem of 'ungovernability' identified by the first paradigm: either 
the extreme fragmentation of the political party system (hypothetically as a result 
of the proportional electoral system with open-list), or its lack of consistency, or 
the potential indiscipline at the Chamber of Deputies. 
For the abovementioned, even if the concept of coalitional presidentialism 
assumed a 'dialectical form' "in the sense that it can accommodate insights from 
both the 'pessimists' and the 'optimists' at the same time" (POWER, 2010, p. 19), 
this dialectical form would not be completely comprehensive, as pessimistics and 
optimistics still maintain independent positions. The coexistence of an 
ungovernability diagnoses with a governability one was born at the beginning of 
2000s and still prevails. Basically, the paradigm of executive dominance argues 
that the institutional variables of the decision-making process along with the 
institutional powers of the president act together as determinants of legislators' 
behavior in accordance with the preferences of political party leaders (ALSTON et 
al., 2011). 
However, the identified sources of ungovernability remain in force, 
accompanied by concomitant diagnoses. For example, Armijo et al. (2006) should 
be included in the field of governability (but for different reasons from the 
dominant ones, as they understand that governability comes from the inexistence 
of veto powers and from the actors' obligation to engage in negotiations to avoid 
the risk of being excluded). Nevertheless, they observe that "Brazilian political 
institutions are decentralized and thus tend toward excessive resoluteness" 
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(ARMIJO et al., 2006, p. 761), bringing back the diagnosis of ungovernability. As 
observed, there is not a synthesis, but the identification of problems, and the 
diagnoses about them coexist in tension within a broad debate. 
 
Imposing or organizing the cooperation? 
Among those admitting there is indeed governability in the Brazilian 
political system, there is a consensus. The system is turning around a pivot: the 
strong president. However, there are differences in the strategies used by the 
president to obtain parliamentary cooperation, considering that president and 
congress pursue different agendas.  
The president is strong. But, what is he strong for? For imposing or for 
organizing cooperation? The paradigm of executive dominance supports the first. 
For Shugart and Carey (1992) strong presidents do not feel compelled to seek 
cooperation in congress. As they are strong, they impose their will; this would be 
the Brazilian case. 
Note that Figueiredo and Limongi (1999) stand up for cooperation 
through dominance: "mechanisms to organize the agenda can increase the capacity 
of the President to seek cooperation, strengthening cohesion of the governing base. 
A centralized decision-making process transfers the power to propose to the 
executive" (FIGUEIREDO and LIMONGI, 1999, p. 76). 
An alternative interpretation maintains that cooperation is obtained 
through negotiations. Armijo et al. (2006), Palermo (2000), Pereira and Melo 
(2014, p. 35), say, differently from the imposition argument, that the Executive is 
able to organize political cooperation. According to Armijo et al. (2006):  
 
...we identify the reasonably successful core of Brazil’s framework of 
political institutions as its production of multiple incentives to all 
significant players to negotiate and cooperate. Each player retains some 
politically relevant resources, but no one, aside from (perhaps) the 
president, possesses actual veto power ( ARMIJO et al., 2006, p. 767). 
 
Those incentives to negotiation come, largely, from the proactive tools of 
the president, as identified by the paradigm of Executive dominance, but especially 
from institutional balances between the actors, who are induced to cooperate. 
However, such dominance is less the result of the president's resources for 
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imposing his agenda and relies much more on his ability to organize cooperation; 
in fact, the central point of this argument is the possibility of negotiation to ensure 
cooperation. 
Hence, for some critical authors of the paradigm of the Executive 
dominance, this represents an excessive emphasis on formal rules, at the expense 
of analysis of political processes, in which actors freedom to move between 
interests and institutions are more prevalent. This difference is, certainly, a 
landmark in the current political debate. Armijo et al. mentioned (2006): "(the 
recurrent model of negotiation) recognizes the same sources of inefficiency 
(ungovernability) than previous models did but, unlike the model of executive 
dominance, is skeptical about the ability of the executive chief to prevail for a long 
time through the harassment (bullying) of other politicians" (ARMIJO et al., 2006, 
p. 770). 
There is no doubt the "driving forces of Brazilian policies is the set of 
strong powers given to the president by the Constitution of 1988" (POWER, 2010, 
p. 25). But his usage of available tools has allowed different interpretations. 
 
Post consensus of governability? 
But what is the scope of the analytical perspective that goes beyond 
governability? Although some displacements are clear, it does not seem that a 
consensus emerged. 
Some authors call attention to the costs involved in obtaining 
governability. According to Armijo et al. (2006): 
 
Though time-consuming, constant negotiation performs the 
essential but sometimes underappreciated function of interest 
aggregation... the process of enabling multiple sectors and 
regions and interests to feel themselves to be participating in 
the national policy-making process is of utmost importance... 
Thus, a continuous debate between state governors and federal 
authorities over fiscal matters and allocation of funds... can be 
viewed as predatory federalism. Or it might instead be 
reconceptualized as a Brazilian version of checks and balances 
(ARMIJO et al., 2006, p.768). 
 
 
Although the authors refer to incentives, it is evident that they place less 
emphasis on institutional rules, trying to connect the political system with society, 
Brazilian Political Institutions: an 
Inconclusive Debate 
(2016) 10 (2)                                           e0003 – 8/29 
and institutions with the social and economic Brazilian diversity. And they do so 
with a tinge of conformism, perhaps skepticism, by saying that the process could 
be seen as predatory federalism. In the same way, some authors would argue that 
the decision-making process is sufficiently, though not entirely, democratic. After 
the "path of muddling through gridlock" (KINGSTONE, 2000, p. 76), it would be an 
acceptable second best. 
This spirit is largely expressive of a majority of authors which support the 
paradigm of governability. In their most schematic versions, as we have already 
pointed out, the notion of governability does not mean a good government.  
Indeed, the interpretation that Brazilian political institutions ensure 
governability is stripped of important normative implications present in 
subsequent works. The wave of more recent contributions shifts the focus toward 
governance (PEREIRA and MELO, 2014), the quality of the political system 
representation (SANTOS and ALMEIDA, 2011), accountability, effectiveness and 
efficiency of public policies. 
The contributions of Marta Arretche (2009, 2012) illustrate this point. 
Arretche (2012) argues that "incremental gains in state capacity to improve 
citizens' wellbeing were achieved in the last two decades" (ARRETCHE, 2012, p. 
16). In other words, the author postulates a change in the quality of public policy, 
which is largely based on the decisions taken along the drafting of the 1988 
Constitution (which does not mean that some of those do not indicate any 
problems of political legitimacy). The centralized logics of transfers toward 
municipalities, in a highly formalized process, with its impact on the reduction of 
cross-jurisdictions inequality, would be a good example. In this case, it is the 
capacity of the Brazilian political system to provide public services to citizens that 
is under examination. 
This line of inquiry is not the only one of a sort of post-consensus about 
governability that seems to be assumed by the most recent literature. As Santos 
and Almeida (2011) indicate, proposals of reforms usually focus on governability, 
but a different concern should be raised: the enhancement of the political system 
must necessarily pass through measures that allow reducing the instruments of 
governability in the hands of the Executive, because the capacity of the Executive 
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to intervene in the legislative agenda negatively affects parties. It would be a trade-
off with the representative dimension. 
 
Dysfunctions of coalitional presidentialism  
What are the inherent dysfunctions of coalitional presidentialism? It is 
assumed that it addresses and solves clearly identified dysfunctions. But, does it 
not produce other? Does the relevance of the use of material resources to organize 
the coalition not mean a source of misrule? Pereira and Melo (2014) largely 
express the ambiguity with which coalitional presidentialism is perceived: 
 
 ...it can be considered as a suboptimal functional settlement. It can be 
plenty of many problems, including clientelism, corruption and lack of 
transparency. The extensive use of pork and other political currencies 
can undermine the legitimacy and represent a downside of this method 
of government. However, it has generated political stability and has not 
degenerated into systemic corruption, with robust political competition 
and strong autonomous institutions (PEREIRA and MELO,  2014, p. 175).  
 
 
Has it not degenerated into systemic corruption? In any case, to what 
extent the dynamics of corruption scandals is not rooted in the mechanisms of the 
presidential management of multiparty coalitions? 
Amorim Neto (2006) also believes that the emergence of Executives 
supported by stable majorities at the Congress, and of a solid division between 
government and opposition, occurs at the high price of excessively debilitating the 
Legislature and the representatives, considered individually.  
Figueiredo and Limongi (1999), in turn, argue that the presidents of the 
current democratic era proved to be more effective than those of the period 1946-
1964 in the pursuit of their programmatic agenda. However, this would have 
happened in detriment of representatives' participation in the drafting of laws, 
specifically in those areas in which the Executive has exclusive legislative initiative. 
The improvement of government effectiveness took place at the cost of 
establishing a zero-sum game between the President and representatives. The 
change of parties systematically carried out by legislators can be seen as an 
instrument of governability, but also, as a focus of delegitimization of the Congress 
and of political parties. The same can be said about the integration of the cabinet as 
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an instrument of coalitional composition; for example, the ministerial cabinet of 
Dilma reached 39 members. Beyond the cost of coordination, it is clear that this 
affects the intrinsic quality of public policies. Meanwhile, the number of effective 
parties in the new legislature is thirteen (number that was never reached before), 
and the biggest party barely reaches 13% of the members, a degree of 
fragmentation that contradicts many diagnoses about the evolution of the party 
system, and that might block the formation of stable majorities. 
Power (2010) considers that "the enhancement of presidential agenda 
power (to achieve governability) implies a reactive legislature (which may erode 
democratic quality)" (POWER, 2010, p. 27). The coalitional presidentialism has 
gone from being described as a 'dilemma' (ABRANCHES, 1988) to being 
understood as 'ordinary politics' (ZUCCO JR., 2007). Actually, for him, it continues 
to be a dilemma, considering that the option itself implies costs. Its interpretative 
'standardization' does not impede from perceiving its problematic dimensions. 
In contrast, Pereira and Melo (2014) indicate that although "these 
exchanges are often viewed as less than legitimate by the press and the majority of 
society, they constitute the basis of relations between the executive and legislative 
powers in Brazil ... such exchanges lead to high levels of governability allowing us 
to carry out important reforms"(PEREIRA and MELO, 2014, p. 176). Hence, the 
operation of coalitional machine involves the creation of permanent gaps between 
society and the political system, so that the exchanges are as necessary as costly in 
terms of legitimacy. 
Therefore, the relation between corruption and governability is a central 
point. In the current Brazilian political system, taking into account their rules of 
game, can we say that corruption is inherent to governability? In other words, the 
system does not work without an ingredient of corruption, as it is often a 
requirement for building alliances. But if so, the corruption is by itself a source of 
ungovernability (as it is illustrated by the case of mensalão, but also by some 
aspects of the representation crisis, because the corruption is one of the reasons 
that explain the rejection of political parties and politicians). In sum, corruption, 
which is necessary for good governance (at least under the coalitional 
presidentialism), is at the same time a disruptive factor of ungovernability. 
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Governability, centralization of decisions and interests 
A problem related to the preceding one is the funding of political activities, 
which is one of the negative aspects that also helps to deepen the representation 
crisis and the gap between the political system and the citizenship. As observed by 
Samuels (2006) "the interests of corporate elites influence elections and political 
process… the presidential dispute is almost entirely funded by companies' 
contributions… key point, the absence of national influence of parties on the 
distribution of funds of campaigns" (SAMUELS, 2006, p. 145). This close proximity 
between corporate elites and political candidates weakens the parties, as well as 
undermines their legitimacy, as the electorate perceives the relationship between 
politics and business as negative. 
Indeed, the nature of the relation between the political system and 
corporate interests is at stake. The 'capitalism of ties' (LAZZARINI, 2011), as a form 
of representation of economic agents in Brazil, is highly asymmetric, tilted in favor 
of the latter. It is inscribed in the current 'political grammar' (NUNES, 2010), even 
because of the numerical importance of entrepreneurs in the parliamentary blocs. 
The institutions of coalitional presidentialism, starting with electoral rules, have 
been able to do very little to soften this imbalance. So, we have a 'capitalism of 
friends' with a bifront shape, meaning that it combines a sector closer to a typical 
'crony capitalism', and another one chaired by highly institutionalized  forms – a 
'capitalism of ties'.  
In one way or another, these configurations were set in motion by the 
reforming coalition under the command of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. As 
Lazzarini (2011) mentions, "nothing more natural than involving public or private 
actors, already enmeshed in local networks, in the process of economy 
restructuration" (LAZZARINI, 2011, p. 114). It is important to clarify that state 
institutions often dominate the game, taking precedence over capitalists (even if it 
is to serve them better, following Francisco de Oliveira et al. (2010), and that the 
parties are the ones which result oppressed by these tensions. "Pension Funds - 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, said - are "new stars"... With a little help of BNDES 
bank, then, everything is perfect: we have the alliance between State, trade unions, 
pension funds and the luckiest large companies who benefit from associating with 
them" (cited by LAZZARINI, 2011, p.116). "Pension funds of state companies – 
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adds Lazzarini (2011) – were and probably will be political instruments of the 
government – any government" (LAZZARINI, 2011, p.116). 
The main point here is the power concentration of the political system. 
The decision-making centralization in the Executive and in specialized institutions, 
such as the BNDES, implies narrowing access and spaces for influence which 
improves governance but also makes more opaque and selective the 'intimate and 
historic entanglement' from which political actors are, in the long run, excluded. 
Meanwhile, a breakthrough, involving both the different levels of the state 
and the political forces, has been the insulation of certain public policies - mainly, 
education, health, income transfer – from the exchanging of political favors. 
It should be noted that the revaluation of the representative dimension 
takes place in Brazil, after undergoing some major changes in the relationship 
between society and the political system that, in contrast, represents a remarkable 
continuity. In effect, while the protests of June 2013 showed how the renewal of 
Brazilian democracy has as a source a critical public opinion developed outside 
institutions2 the presidential elections, with PSDB and PT reaching the second 
round, shows that the party system continues its course, reinforcing the bipartisan 
pattern of the presidential competition (in spite of increasing fragmentation at the 
state level). Although it is too early to see it, the improvement of Brazilian 
institutions could be obtained both from the institutional game and  from an active 
public opinion. The perception of corruption, for example, emerges strongly and, 
without any doubt, will have an impact in the future. The Law of Clean Tab (Lei da 
Ficha Limpa) is a result of these on-going changes3. 
It is true, as Pereira and Melo (2014) argue, that people have shown higher 
levels of confidence in the judiciary and the media: "this level of expanded 
accountability has clearly led to a great citizen dissatisfaction with the status quo 
… Brazil is in transition toward a good governance, and improved effectiveness of 
checks has resulted in an expanded consciousness on political corruption" (Pereira 
and Melo, 2014, p. 136). But here the explanatory variable - effectiveness of checks 
- receives the full weight of the explanation, which is a little difficult to sustain. 
Besides, greater levels of confidence in the judiciary should not be exaggerated as 
                                                          
2 Only 25% of young people, between 16 and 17 years old, obtain the elector title; this 
number is dropping since 2006. 
3 I thank Helcimara Telles for the ideas exchanged about these issues. 
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well as the causal relationship attributed to citizen dissatisfaction could be taken 
more cautiously (if we have in mind, for example, the impact of judicial 'delays' in 
the mensalão). In fact, other factors seem to be more important, such as increasing 
social expectations due to economic progress or dissatisfaction with the high levels 
of the tax burden along with citizens' perceptions regarding the underfunding of 
first-order public policies). 
 
Leadership styles and strategies: do they count? 
The authors who assign (almost) all explanatory power to institutional 
rules (as Figueiredo and Limongi (1998), for example), assume that the quality or 
the nature of leadership is not decisive to explain the performance of government 
coalitions. An evidence to support this argument would be that good performance 
cannot come from very dissimilar leadership styles. This is a dimension where 
authors attributing the Executive dominance to the rules of the game seem to go 
too far.  
Contrastingly, those authors who deposit part of the explanation in the 
interactions of actors having capacity of choice (as ARMIJO et al., 2006; PALERMO, 
2000), give the leadership (and differences in style, talent, abilities of persuasion, 
experience, good fortune, etc) a much greater explanatory role. The choices of 
leaders, for them, are conditioned but not determined by game rules. They depend 
on interpretations, not only on changing conjunctures, of the political-institutional 
morphology in which they are developed (because rules are 'read' in different 
ways). 
For sure, institutional constraints have an undeniable role. It can be said, 
for example, that Lula made political errors in his first term, when building his 
government coalition; learning from these mistakes, in turn, provided for later 
emendation in the configuration of a more consistent and stable coalition in his 
second term. This enables us to conclude that some readings are more adequate 
than others; but never that leaders are fiercely subject to rules. As highlighted by 
Amorim Neto et al. (2003), "the pattern of governability in Brazil depends on a 
strategic choice made by the president according to the specific policy conditions 
that he faces" (AMORIM NETO et al., 2003, p. 568). This strategic choice happens 
between two governmental formulas: multiparty majoritarian governments (or 
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multiparty cartel) and multiparty minority governments (or absence of cartel). 
This strategic choice is fully political and is not mechanically a by-product of any 
institutional morphology. 
 
Checks and balances: from governability to good government 
In spite of the governability paradigm being firmly rooted, we can be sure 
that the Brazilian political debate is going much further. Now, the notion of 
governability also includes the good government and the quality of public policies. 
Perhaps Pereira and Melo (2014) are emblematic of this position. They argue that 
a good government depends not only on a (institutionally) strong president, but 
also, on an institutional network of checks and balances that counterweigh the 
presidential power. For them, Brazil has done very significant advances in these 
areas since the Constitution of 1988. In other words, for the authors, Brazil is not 
only a governable country, but a country susceptible to be well-governed. This 
possibility rests on the operational effectiveness of several institutions (extensive 
controls by the Congress, judiciary, state governors, Public Ministry, audit 
agencies, etc). Hence, the governability sources would be different from those 
advanced by the interpretation stressing the executive dominance.  
A shift in the problem of investigation from governability to good 
government involves devoting more attention to control institutions and to 
balances and checks of the political system. It is assumed that, in a presidential 
system, it is these institutions which prevent degeneration. They, in fact, constrict 
political actors to be bound by the law. The judiciary constitutes part of the checks 
and balances system, and so the quality of its operation directly affects the 
possibility of good governance.  
The good performance of Brazilian judicial institutions and audit agents 
(according to international comparisons), depends on policy competition. As 
indicated by Pereira and Melo (2014), elite competition and political 
fragmentation increase the costs of coordination of political elites and make it 
more difficult to attack the judiciary and to control the institutions after decisions 
affecting their interests are made; thus, the more competitive the political system 
is, the more autonomous judicial institutions and audit agents are. 
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This interpretation represents a point of view fairly novel concerning the 
proverbial fragmentation of the Brazilian party system. Given that Pereira and 
Melo (2014) argue that the political competition and the diversity of political 
parties operate to restrict presidential action, we can infer that reducing the 
number of parties would be actually counter-productive, potentially increasing the 
executive dominance. 
 
Displacements in the agenda 
From presidentialism to political institutions 
Ex post facto, it is clear that the 1988 Constitution framers made a 
strategic decision: instead of reframing the most problematic aspects of the 
Brazilian political-institutional framework, they basically led them intact and put 
in place instruments aiming at counteracting its effects. This strategy is not novel 
in the drafting of constitutions; but in this case, it is particularly striking how clear 
it was. That is the case of some proactive instruments allowing the president to 
both keep the initiative in the political agenda and organize the cooperation of a 
large number of parties. Actually, it is the institutional powers upon which relies 
the legislative work and the president actions which makes inconsistent 
organizations to turn into political parties with discipline and cohesion. This might 
be an artificial consistency, but it is effective, considering that the parties gain 
stability and predictability. The statement that 'political parties matter' despite the 
fact they are still weak and fragmented organizations (NICOLAU, 2015), typical of 
the governability paradigm, opens the path toward the understanding of the ways 
in which the decision-making power in the Brazilian coalitional presidentialism is 
distributed. 
First, the executive power is shared (AMORIM NETO, 2000; PALERMO, 
2000). This is a pre-condition for the existence of a government coalition. 
Depending on the case (coalescence), this distribution expresses the partisan 
diversity of the coalition, mediated by the number of seats each party has in 
Congress. It also introduces a strong element of consensualism in the political 
dynamics. All that has been observed contradicts the notion, assumed by the 
ungovernability paradigm, that under presidentialism it is impossible to share the 
executive power or to structure effective inter-party coalitions. On the contrary, 
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the dynamics of coalition formation and its role on the effectiveness of presidential 
regimes has displaced the electoral rules as the center of the debate. 
Presidents, using their institutional agenda powers, can build coalitions, or 
to be more exact, transform initially minority governments into majority ones 
(SANTOS, 2003). Of course, stable coalitions in Brazil would be impossible without 
centralization instruments; the same can nonetheless be said about 
decentralization forces, as once the political parties hold ministerial positions, 
their preferences matter, even if the initiative in the decision-making process is 
kept in president's hands. Actually, it is not a zero-sum game; the president gains 
power, and so do political parties. The first is strengthened by centralizing the 
decision-making power and by having a majority and more reliable supporting 
political forces; the latter by sharing the cabinet. According to Amorim Neto 
(2006), the fact that "almost all of the presidents that did not obtain or maintain a 
parliamentary majority, did not complete either their constitutional mandates" 
(AMORIM NETO, 2006, p. 342), indicates that although the president figure is 
powerful, the parliamentary base is essential. 
One might think that the presidential predominance is in part a 
consequence of both weakness and poor consistency of political parties: political 
parties do not fulfill their role of bringing near what is different, overcoming the 
dissimilarity of purposes. Then, presidents make it directly (in this sense, there is a 
significant difference with parliamentarianism), dominating the parliamentary 
agenda, a process in which political parties, in parliament, acquire a different 
consistency. 
The truth is that, if after three decades of debate, presidentialism is not 
being blamed anymore, new elements are being introduced into the discussion, 
related to: the role of the fragmented partisan system as a counterbalance to the 
presidency power; the key importance of checks and balances for good 
government; and the ways in which presidents build and hold coalitions. 
 
Congress as an active actor 
Better understanding the role of Congress is a new field of study that 
diverges from the executive dominance paradigm. A recent example is the book 
written by Santos and Almeida (2011), studying how legislators overcome 
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institutional barriers to acquire and distribute information related to the framing 
of public policies. By arguing that the Brazilian coalitional presidentialism has 
clear informational foundations, the study breaks with the previous consensus, 
which assigned to the Committees a passive role. Instead, authors argue that the 
system of permanent committees has a relevant informational role, and not just 
the reactive that role literature recognizes. Committees have the capacity to 
produce additional information to what is produced by the Executive, reducing the 
uncertainty of the floor. The production of their own and more reliable 
information is valuable when voting projects. 
 Thus, Santos and Almeida (2011) mention: "A new generation of studies 
about Congress is pointing out several features of legislative activity that mitigate 
the classification of Senate as reactive… Studies about specific public policies also 
indicate a more proactive behavior…" (SANTOS and ALMEIDA, 2011, p. 128)4. 
Another example is the important article of Silveira and Silva (2014) about 
the 'appropriation' phenomenon, by which presidents take as theirs, bills being 
proposed by Congress. The authors mention, "Appropriation shows that Brazilian 
Presidents must go beyond coalitional presidentialism" (SILVEIRA and SILVA, 
2014, p. 126). The appropriation would make it clear that the president's agenda 
power is also used in different ways than those provided by the executive 
dominance paradigm: 
 
...partisan and ideological diversity as well as the multitude of topics up 
for debate in Congress do not always make formal majorities as 
malleable as the President's need to govern... agenda power may be 
applied to the articulation of new expressions for forming parliamentary 
majorities, both for the strengthening of formal coalitions as well as for 
the construction of majorities, also external to the party base of 
government support. And this is the new way of looking at the power of 
the agenda as indicated by the practice of Appropriation. (...) the 
perspective of the phenomenon of Appropriation points to an alternative 
use of the agenda power that does not present as much adhesion to 
formal coalitions, which ground many of the arguments on coalitional 
Presidentialism” ( SILVEIRA and SILVA, 2014, p. 122). 
 
                                                          
4 These authors refer to: Amaral, Ana Regina Villar Peres (2009); Braga, Ricardo de João 
(2011); Gomes, Fabio de Barros Correia (2011); Martins, Ricardo Chaves de Rezende 
(2011); Souza, João Ricardo Carvalho de (2010) and Vieira, Fernando Sabóia (2009).  
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The formation of coalitions ad hoc, with participation of the opposition, is 
typical when this instrument is in the hands of the Executive. In sum, 
appropriation would aim to compensate the high political costs for the president, 
inherent to holding together a very heterogeneous formal coalition. 
 
Strengthening representation 
Some studies have highlighted some facets of the Brazilian political 
representation that, at least, make it mandatory to soften the tone of usual 
interpretations, pointing out its serious deficits. That is the case of two excellent 
articles, by Gurza Lavalle et al. (2006), and by Pogrebinschi and Santos (2011). The 
first examines processes that, involving the Executive, reconfigure conventional 
representation and can converge toward a new expansion of democracy. Their 
study essentially examines the political representation exerted by civil 
organizations. Backed by a solid empirical research, Gurza Lavalle et al. (2006) 
point out that: 
 
The support supplied by civil organizations to political 
candidates is, by far, the more accurate prediction variable for the 
propensity of these civil organizations to assume the representation of 
their beneficiaries. Other factors also point to the centrality of the 
interrelations between civil organizations and political institutions... 
dynamics of political representation in the field of civilian organizations 
does not occur in parallel or alternative to traditional channels of 
politics, but in close connection with them... as an effort of 
intermediation to establish connection between segments of population, 
bad or underrepresented, with the State and the circuits of electoral 
politics (GURZA LAVALLE et al., 2006, p. 44). 
 
The authors also indicate a 'relevant historical displacement' in the 
meanings the organizations themselves confer to their actions. Thus, the typical 
forms of representation prevailing in the second half of the XXth century, such as 
the criticism of political representation and the notion of 'genuine representation', 
gave way to "new understandings clearly embodying the processes of 
reconfiguration of political representation by extending its locus and functions to 
the field of drawing, implementing and supervising public policies" (GURZA 
LAVALLE et al., 2006, p. 55). This reconfiguration process would have taken place 
with the support of long-term changes in civil organizations profiles, which 
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occurred in the framework of the transformations of the Brazilian state in the last 
few decades. 
Meanwhile, Pogrebinschi and Santos (2011) frame their research in some 
broader debates contrasting, within the democratic theory, variables of 
participation, discussion and representation, and the Brazilian specifics. Analyzing 
the impact of deliberations of national conferences on public policies over the 
legislative activity in Congress between 1988 and 2009, the authors conclude that 
"mechanisms that seek to expand the participation of citizens in the political 
decision-making process can impact the legislative production of the Brazilian 
Legislative Power" (POGREBINSCHI and SANTOS, 2011, p. 260). In this way, an 
empirical investigation of considerable scale allows them to understand: on the 
one hand, how, processes of participatory and deliberative nature are articulated 
with the representation process, as new forms of political mediation that present 
strong potential to deepen democracy in Brazil: 
 
We are interested in facing the national conferences of public policies as 
participative experiences that, in the meantime, strengthen the formal 
political representation and reinforce the functions and activities of 
traditional political institutions... national conferences strengthen 
parliamentary representation multiplying the ways of vocalization and 
aggregation of important interests for society. In this sense, conferences 
provide a new form of expression of participatory elements that 
constitutes the concept and practice of political representation 
(POGREBINSCHI and SANTOS, 2011, p. 299). 
 
And, on the other hand, establishing these characteristics on an empirical 
basis makes it possible to foray into the field of democratic theory, arguing that 
"participation and resolution can be taken as constituent elements of political 
representation" (POGREBINSCHI and SANTOS, 2011, p. 300). The data collected 
 
...seem to contribute to deconstruct the discourse that representative 
democracy and its institutions are in crisis in Brazil, as well as the 
argument that political representation is a second best alternative, 
considering the factual impossibility of establishing, in contemporary 
societies, direct forms of democracy that provide the participation of 
citizens without the mediation of elected representatives (...) social 
participation should not be understood as the opposite to political 
representation (POGREBINSCHI and SANTOS, 2011, p. 300). 
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Political culture 
Power (2010) mentions "Coalitional presidentialism has a far better 'fit' 
with reality after 1995, during the Cardoso-Lula era, than it did in the 
comparatively chaotic early years of democracy. We cannot yet be sure why this is 
the case" (POWER, 2010, p. 29). A possible interpretation is that there was 
learning based on the experiences with institutional rules, and that this learning 
resulted in effective courses of action when virtuous leadership emerged. As 
observed by Whitehead (2009), FHC presided the transition toward mass politics. 
With the arrival of PT, the transition was completed. Not only because, beyond the 
fluctuation of voters, large segments of electorate were included in an 
unprecedented way in democratic politics, but also, because a new elite came to 
power completing the spectrum of political representation5 (POWER, 2010, p. 62). 
However, one of the reasons why coalitional presidentialism settled with 
Cardoso and Lula is the harmony between the set of rules and the Brazilian 
political culture. This can be defined as the culture of composition, which 
appreciates pragmatism and negotiation, while being akin to cooptation and elitist 
conciliation. It does not give many chances to the emergence of populist leaders, 
making leadership a rather institutional element (as evidenced by the trajectory of 
Lula's leadership, before and after his arrival to the Presidency). It also delimits a 
fuzzy line between public and private sectors, and does not defend the government 
from the rule of law. Additionally, it presents "disturbingly low levels of attitudinal 
support for democracy" (POWER, 2010, p. 30). In the operation of the Brazilian 
political system, these characteristics are present as both normative rules and 
practices. The President exercises a leadership of composition, avoiding to 
establishing direct links with public opinion, and systematically practicing 
cooptation of individuals, and especially, of collective actors (Lula is not an 
exception to this). Political elites consummate endless transactions and a myriad of 
clients seek to outflank, permanently, the limits of the public.  
                                                          
5 As observed by Santos (2008) "what appears to be the most important variable in the 
stabilization and rationalization of the political game in Brazil is the emergence of a strong 
leftist party, both at the ballot box and in Congress, whose leaders are focused on 
occupying government with the aim of promoting changes to the status quo, within the 
context of the rules of representative democracy" (SANTOS, 2008, p. 63). 
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Hence, the political culture of Brazilian people (ALMEIDA, 2007), favors an 
approximation to the manners of society (the Brazilian 'jeitinho'), accepting the 
corruption and also the flexibility with which the political system deals with it. 
Great part of society rejects in politics what at the same time is willing to accept in 
its own political culture. Of course, this is a widespread phenomenon and, in Brazil, 
as in other places, contributes to deepen the existent gap between society and 
political system. As mentioned by Pereira and Melo (2014), protests have been 
against government performance, not against institutions. It could hardly be 
otherwise, but this feature shows the virtuous effect of preserving the institutions 
from the fury that chooses men as a target. 
 
Political reform 
The debate about a reform to political institutions has been permanent 
and has been translated in different bills. Some authors, including Santos (2006), 
have begun to discuss proposals for strengthening the legislative branch. But it is 
obvious that this discussion is characterized by incrementalism and caution. 
Soares and Rennó (2006) mention that along with several proposals for specific 
adjustments, there is strong resistance to drastic change of the Brazilian political-
institutional structure. In other words, Brazil continues with its tradition of partial 
reforms; only in part, this is related to the uncertainty arising, among potentially 
affected people, from a change in the rules of the game. It also relates to a spirit of 
conservatism that is wary of institutional innovation. 
As Soares and Rennó (2006) have mentioned, some people support the 
idea of maintaining the actual structure of political representation, because by 
doing so, they consider, the system would go toward stable and desirable results. 
For others, in contrast, the Brazilian electing system creates some distortions in 
the links between elected representatives and voters. They suggest a reduction in 
the number of candidates and in the magnitude of districts, and the adoption of 
closed-lists, and, above all, the prohibition of coalitions in proportional elections 
(NICOLAU, 2015). These changes would tend to provide more visibility to voters 
and more ability to evaluate representatives, as well as would forge closer ties with 
political parties. 
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Anyway, the care to highlight the pros and cons of each alternative, and to 
note that each problem is inevitably a dilemmatic one, is permanently present. As 
seen in Nicolau (2006), who examines the closed-list, open and flexible systems, 
whatever the chosen system is, there will always be inevitable advantages and 
disadvantages when 'buying the package' (negative aspects along with the 
positive). The issue is closely related to the trade-off 'representation-
governability'. 
Of course, the political reform is more important for those who perceive 
the Brazilian political system going through a deficit of representation. In this case, 
some audacious suggestions have recently been created (SANTOS and ALMEIDA, 
2011), specially related to reforms oriented to giving a more active role to the 
legislative power. The objective is to increase the benefits of being in the 
opposition and to decrease the costs of being outside the government. The change 
would focus on the rules of Congress organization benefiting the parliamentarian 
of the opposition and reducing the costs of not having position in the cabinet. The 
idea is to: increase the Congress' power to allocate resources (making the budget 
imperative instead of authoritative); increase the decision-making power of 
permanent technical committees; and, alter the structure of the opportunities that 
politicians face.  
However, we might wonder whether these reforms would fit in the logic of 
coalitional presidentialism or would break with it. Would a congress with more 
ability to allocate resources and with a greater decision-making power in its 
permanent technical Committees, not be separate from the golden rule of 
coalitional presidentialism, which is the dominant role of the president as center 
and coordinator of the political cooperation and as great formulator of initiatives? 
Perhaps, if adopted, proposals such as the aforementioned would usher in a stage 
that will leave behind coalitional presidentialism as we know it today. They would 
open a space of uncertainty, but would mean the promise of a new improvement 
for the Brazilian democratic quality.  
 
Final questions 
Taking into account the discussions conducted so far, we believe 
appropriate to ask two questions, yet we cannot give definitive answers to them. 
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The first one is: Does the Brazilian political system have the essential 
conditions to preserve itself from (semi)authoritarian experiences, particularly 
those that have been recently seen in Latin America, where a political force with 
anti-republican (and anti-liberal) characteristics reaches the government and 
consolidates a dominant electoral position (temporarily), and is supported by a 
long enough period of fiscal and external bonanza? If we observed, for example, the 
case of Argentina, the answer would be clearly negative. In Brazil, the answer to 
the paradigm of governability would be ambiguous: it is impossible to obtain a 
clear conclusion in this regard. In contrast, Pereira and Melo (2014) would give an 
affirmative answer: the Brazilian political system counts with auto-defenses, 
particularly related to its checks and balances. The PT may have unbalanced the 
political system; its behavior was sparsely republican in many fields, and it even 
made attempts to consolidate a position of power bowing rules of the game, but 
did not succeed to alter the political system (aparelhamento do estado, media 
regulation, etc). 
However, the question considered as a whole, I think, was not the case of 
such an overflow. Why is that? On the one hand, the structure of the Brazilian 
political party system is very fragmented and competitive, which made the PT not 
being able to achieve a dominant position. On the other hand, the strength of 
controls (a strong presidency counterbalanced by control institutions that work) 
would prevent authoritarian strategies. Moreover, perhaps, a different historical 
orientation in political/cultural level, made the difference: while in Argentina this 
orientation would be in favor of the dominant parties or the hegemonic 
movements, in Brazil the post-varguista configuration that emerged in 1946 gave 
rise to a multiparty array, and to subsequent electoral bases that were maintained. 
Finally, the density of social actors, and their strength vis à vis state and political 
actors, demonstrates the existence (relatively recent) of a civil society independent 
from the state7. 
The second question is: considering the conditions to preserve itself from 
authoritarian experiences, does Brazil also have the conditions to preside 
sustained economic growth and prosperity, as Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), and 
more recently, neoinstitutionalist approach argue, based on the role of correct 
incentives emerging fundamentally from political-institutional frameworks. The 
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answer is more doubtful. Alston et al. (2011) would be optimistic, answering yes 
with caveats. Pereira and Melo (2014) would also be included in this group. In 
these cases, the argument would be that Brazil walks slowly but firmly toward the 
rule of law; the consolidation of republican institutions; the division of powers; 
and, everything that would be, as property rights, the pillar of limited power and of 
the reduction of transaction costs; briefly, basic incentives and strategic blunders 
of growing and prosperity. 
Assuming that this theory is correct, it must be remembered that Brazil 
has a long tradition of state intervention, which is not consonant with the 
institutionalist prescription. In any case, the harmonization of both grammars is 
yet to be seen (although we are talking about a country that, according to Nunes 
(2010), has always been able to harmonize different grammars). Anyway, what 
seems to be clear is that the Brazilian political system is not in its way to redefine 
the relationship between the state and the world of economic agents. In other 
words, it is not so clear that Brazil is going to 'correctly' set incentives. 
 
Conclusions 
Considered in its broadest terms, the Brazilian debate on political 
institutions seems to evoke, in the best Brazilian intellectual tradition, the balance 
of opposites (FREYRE, 2007). The debate perceives the political system as a set of 
rules and incentives, in opposition, not in synthesis, but in an unstable equilibrium, 
in which each rule produce effects, and generate contrary incentives. To give a 
simple example, the electoral rules provide incentives for politicians behaving 
individually, while the internal rules of Congress, the president's power to 
legislate, and the centralization of benefits by the president, create incentives for 
legislators to be loyalty to their political party and to the presidential preferences. 
Even when this balance of opposites is not unique to Brazil, it is strongly rooted in 
historical processes of the Brazilian national policy. It is, in a way, the touchstone 
of the Brazilian political institutions. The most recent development of mechanisms 
of checks and balances (PEREIRA and MELO, 2014) is part of this line of 
institutional development. 
Based on this perspective, the reason why the interpretations about the 
Brazilian political system are so dissimilar gets clear. As Amorim Neto (2006) 
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observes, while Figueiredo and Limongi (1999) say the actual Brazilian system 
operates similar to the parliamentarian system (political parties as coordination 
mechanisms), Ames (2001) asserts the opposite: political parties are brought to 
govern through fragile ad hoc coalitions. For Amorim Neto (2006), however, the 
pattern of governability is neither consistently atomistic nor consistently 
parliamentarian. Considering the governments of Sarney, Collor, Franco, and FHC, 
"only the latter formed a solid multi-party cabinet and controlled legislative 
agenda as an European prime minister. The others did so through unstable ad hoc 
coalitions" (AMORIM NETO, 2006, p. 344). 
The fact is that the Brazilian political system has demonstrated all these 
years a remarkably stability (another reason to be careful in the proposition of 
changes). It is not entirely clear which reforms to get rid of the danger of 'unstable 
coalitions ad hoc' or of cesarists experiences would be. Anyway, it is noticeable 
that, even if now the interpretations about the Brazilian political system can be 
different, these are not as comprehensive as when the debate was polarized 
between only two paradigms. The opening of a very expressive research space 
beyond the consensus of governability is a significant promise for the Brazilian 
academic debate. 
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